Recasting the dynamics of post-acquisition integration: An embeddedness perspective by Rouzies, Audrey et al.
  1 
DISTORTED AND ADAPTIVE INTEGRATION: REALIZED POST-ACQUISITION 
INTEGRATION AS EMBEDDED IN AN ECOLOGY OF PROCESSES  
 
ABSTRACT 
Research on post-acquisition integration has to a large extent ignored the myriad of changing 
contextual forces confronting acquirers as they attempt to combine organisations. To explore 
how these forces shape intended post-acquisition integration efforts and outcomes, we examine 
the unfolding of a post-acquisition integration process in a company faced with an unanticipated 
fall in demand due to the global economic crisis of 2008. Through a qualitative, longitudinal 
study, we conducted 151 interviews during 2008-2010 to uncover post-acquisition perceptions, 
decisions, actions and outcomes. We find that post-acquisition integration unfolds as an 
adaptive process, embedded in an ecology of interactive and simultaneous processes that 
disperse managerial attention. Intended integration is distorted as attention shifts lead to 
deviation from integration plans, subsequently both accelerating and impeding integration. This 
has implications for the realized level and speed of integration. Our findings matter to 
academics and practitioners as they show how contextual change can shift managerial attention 
so influencing the way integration is carried out and affecting outcomes. Our findings help 
explain why post-acquisition integration often unfolds differently to expectations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Post-acquisition integration is critical for value creation (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). 
However, post-acquisition integration processes are difficult to manage and require extensive 
effort and resource dedication (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), and it is well established that 
firms struggle to achieve the desired level of integration. Post-acquisition integration has 
generally been viewed from a choice perspective that assumes integration occurs under constant 
conditions and will work out as planned (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Homburg and 
Bucerius, 2006). Organisations, however, rarely operate in stable conditions as contexts change 
continuously. We know that acquisitions during environmental jolts positively influence firm 
performance (Wan and Yiu, 2009), however our knowledge of the role that the external context 
plays in the unfolding integration process is lacking. To date, research on post-acquisition 
integration has focused narrowly on acquisition characteristics at the time of the deal in order 
to explain post-acquisition integration, thus largely ignoring the complexities and multiplicity 
of the contexts within which integration processes are embedded.  
Contextual change may pose a major challenge for post-acquisition integration as it puts 
pressure on managerial attention, subsequently shaping organisational adaption (Ocasio, 1997), 
affecting effort and resource allocation during the integration process. For instance in a crisis, 
firms will face scarce resources, diminished managerial discretion and restrictive stakeholders 
(Trahms et al., 2013), influencing managerial perspective and engagement (Ocasio, 2011). 
Managerial attention is already under pressure in acquiring firms, as they need to 
simultaneously carry out integration tasks and focus on their on-going activities (Graebner, 
2004, Colman and Lunnan 2011, Puranam et al., 2003). Moreover, it is well established in the 
literature that post-acquisition integration processes divert managerial attention from core 
activities (Hitt et al., 1991; Yu et al., 2005). Therefore, even though managers spend a 
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substantial amount of time defining the strategic rationale of an acquisition in terms of how to 
achieve potential synergies and integrate the firms in the pre-merger phase, unanticipated 
changes external to the integration process may influence managerial attention and distort the 
intended acquisition implementation. This matters as lack of managerial attention to integration 
issues has been shown to be detrimental to acquisition outcomes (Yu et al., 2005). 
We contend that to fully understand post-acquisition integration, we need to examine the 
unfolding integration process as embedded in the broader context. Only a few studies have 
examined how external factors (environmental or market change) challenge the initial strategy 
(Gates and Very, 2003; Quah and Young, 2005). Managers can choose from several strategic 
initiatives in order to adapt to context, with variation reducing or variation increasing 
mechanisms (Burgelman, 1991). This top down selection reflects limited resources 
necessitating attention and resource allocation decisions (Burgelman, 1991). Building on this 
approach for acquisitions, we contend that events and issues external to the integration process 
may prompt managerial attention shift that thus shape the unfolding of the integration process. 
This may be manifest in a change in integration speed from the original plan, with greater or 
less urgency depending upon the nature of the external events and issues (Homburg and 
Bucerius, 2006). For instance, with the advent of a financial crisis, managerial attention may 
focus much more heavily on short-term actions that reduce financial risk and be much less 
engaged with long term actions for uncertain gain. The capacity of managers to actively manage 
such processes in order to adapt the company to its external context may be an important 
organizational capability. Existing research has not studied how post-acquisition processes 
evolve in organisations as they are confronted with contextual change. In this study, we address 
this gap in the literature by examining the unfolding of post-acquisition integration processes 
  4 
in firms as they struggle with contextual change. We thus ask; what shapes the unfolding 
integration process as initially planned by managers? 
In order to investigate the post-acquisition integration process, we gained access to a French 
multinational company (MNC) as they were acquiring a Norwegian firm. Shortly afterwards 
the company was heavily impacted by the financial crisis of 2008 which we found distorted the 
focal integration process. This presented executives with a tension to be managed: needing to 
find resources to manage an integration process as well as weather an economic downturn. As 
such, the case represented a particularly revealing opportunity to inductively explore how 
managers juggle integration actions, continue business-as-usual while attending to emergent 
and unexpected events.  
This paper shows how post-acquisition integration and synergy realisation processes are 
influenced by an acquiring firm’s response to an unanticipated contextual event. Our findings 
reveal how the external event triggers organizational attention shifts, which cause the unfolding 
integration process to deviate from the plan. We recast the post-acquisition integration process 
as one embedded in an ecology of on-going, simultaneous and intertwined processes and 
conceptualise the accelerating and impeding mechanisms that shape its unfolding and adaptive 
nature. 
The paper is organised as follows: first, we review the literatures on post-M&A integration and 
managerial attention, revealing the need for more dynamic studies that address critical issues 
of intertwining events and processes that shape the timing and speed of post-acquisition 
integration. We then introduce our methodology of a qualitative, longitudinal case study of a 
cross-border acquisition that is appropriate for exposing how organisational responses to 
unanticipated events distort integration processes. Finally, we present our emergent model 
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showing how changing objectives, perceptions and initiatives shape post-acquisition integration 
speed and outcomes. We then identify the implications for post-acquisition theory and practice. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: POST-ACQUISITION INTEGRATION AND 
MANAGERIAL ATTENTION 
Post-acquisition integration is “the making of changes in the functional activity arrangements, 
organisational structures and systems, and cultures of combining organisations to facilitate their 
consolidation into a functioning whole” (Pablo, 1994: 806). Strategy scholars have focused on 
post-acquisition integration as an imperative for value-creation (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
Graebner, 2004; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Angwin and Meadows, 2015). However, to date, the 
question of why firms struggle to achieve the desired degree of integration remains largely 
unanswered. We argue that this may be due to the approach taken to conceptualise the 
integration process both in the literature and in the practice of post-acquisition integration. The 
M&A literature has traditionally adopted a choice perspective focusing on how the decisions 
and actions of managers influence the integration process (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994). The integration process is largely addressed as a 
deliberate process (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) in which managers handle decisions regarding 
autonomy, involvement, communication and incentive structures that influence acquisition 
outcomes (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Yu et al., 2005; Schweiger and Goulet, 2000). However, 
more recently, scholars have addressed integration as an internal adaptive process, where 
employees’ reactions (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Schweiger and Denisi, 1991), and sense-
making and sense-giving (Vaara, 2003; Monin et al., 2013) are important emergent issues that 
need to be considered by managers, thus breaking with the view of the integration processes as 
a purely rational and intended phenomenon. 
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We argue that examining the sequence of events endogenous to post-acquisition integration 
process is not sufficient. Managerial attention is dispersed in organizations as managers need 
to deal with, not only business-as-usual and resource demanding integration activities, but also 
other internal and external events. The context managerial decision makers find themselves in 
determines what issues they focus attention upon and their subsequent actions (Ocasio, 1997), 
thus shaping organizational adaptation (Ocasio, 2011). However, the organizational and 
external contexts that post-acquisition integration processes are embedded in, are largely 
ignored in the M&A literature. For instance, only a few studies have examined how external 
factors (environmental or market change) challenge the initial integration strategy (Gates and 
Very, 2003; Quah and Young, 2005). Thus, our knowledge is limited of how events exogenous 
to the integration may strain managerial attention in post-acquisition integration processes.  
Managerial attention during the acquisition process is likely to affect the speed with which 
acquisition integration is carried out. This matters as speed can be linked to a range of 
integration outcomes such as financial performance and behavioural and organizational levels 
of uncertainty (Angwin 2004). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) note that companies prepare for 
integration from the perspective of a “static end point” instead of considering how to achieve 
the desired outcome (Teerikangas and Joseph, 2012). This had led researchers to consider the 
speed with which integration actions should take place with debate over the pros and cons of 
rapid versus slow actions (Angwin, 2004; Quah and Young, 2005; Homburg and Bucerius, 
2006). Some argue for an optimal speed depending on the relatedness of the businesses 
(Homburg and Bucerius, 2006), or whether the transaction is domestic or cross border (Quah 
and Young, 2005), while others suggest there may be timing variances throughout the M&A 
process which may influence post-acquisition outcomes (Angwin, 2004).  
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A well-documented challenge for firms is balancing long-term need for integration, to achieve 
coordination benefits, with the short term need for autonomy to protect the firms’ strategic 
capabilities and avoid disruptive effects (Puranam et al., 2003; 2006). Rapid integration may 
lead to faster exploitation of synergies and reduction of uncertainty (Inkpen et al., 2000), 
whereas slow integration allows for trust and knowledge transfer (Ranft and Lord, 2002). A 
suggested solution to this is a combination of slow and fast integration. Birkinshaw et al., (2000) 
contend that managers seek to limit the risks associated with integration by first attending to 
the pre-acquisition units’ performance, before coordinating activities between the units. 
Successful integration thus requires initial limited task integration, allowing firms to develop 
social relations, subsequently laying the foundations for later coordination.  
Timing, pace and speed may therefore be critical to achieving successful post-acquisition 
integration results (Gomes et al., 2013; Stahl et al., 2013), but there is a need for more research 
into how integration practices and activities are actually performed by managers and shaped by 
the context in which these integration processes are embedded. A deeper understanding of this 
may help explain the challenges firms have with achieving the desired level and speed of 
integration. This matters, not only to an academic audience but also to managers, as it is clear 
that lack of managerial attention to integration issues can lead to detrimental consequences for 
the acquisition (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).  
METHODS 
The research method 
In July 2008, one of the authors met the newly appointed integration manager from the French 
MNC at a yearly meeting of a professional association. This person was sensitive to the 
difficulties that companies usually face during integration processes and was willing to launch 
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a research project designed to examine the integration process over time. The original goal of 
the research project was to analyse the integration process within the organisations and to 
examine employees’ perceptions during this major organisational change through a 
longitudinal, qualitative case study approach. The case study is the appropriate research 
technique for studying complex phenomena within their contexts (Yin, 1984). To understand 
the complexities of the post-acquisition integration process, it is necessary to let the integration 
process reveal itself in a temporal and contextual manner (Pettigrew, 1990). Qualitative 
methods offers rich information (Miles and Huberman, 1994), not accessible by cross sectional 
survey based methodologies and are well suited to access organisational members’ accounts 
and interpretations (Maitlis, 2005). In this study, we adopt an interpretivist approach and 
analyse the case from the perspective of those living it (Corley, 2015). 
As we were planning our first data gathering in September 2008, the economic crisis suddenly, 
and strongly, hit the case companies. This provided us with an unexpected and unique 
opportunity to examine in real time how an external, unanticipated event influences integration 
practices and managerial actions. Even though the case, as such, is a convenience case, it is also 
a revelatory case (Patton, 1990; Harrison and Rouse, 2015) as it makes the impact of an external 
event on an integration process "transparently observable" (Pettigrew, 1990).  
The research setting 
We examine the acquisition of a Norwegian company (NorMang) by a French multinational 
company (FreMang). Both partners operate in the metallurgical industry. The French company 
is the second largest producer of high-grade manganese ore worldwide, the second largest 
producer of manganese alloys worldwide and the world’s leading producer of refined 
manganese alloys. At the industry level, more than 90% of the manganese produced worldwide 
is used in the form of ferro-alloys, mainly in the steel industry (construction, automobile). 
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Before the acquisition of NorMang in 2008, FreMang was already operating in Norway with 
two plants acquired in 1999. Each plant counted around 200 employees. Since 1999, FreMang 
has invested considerably in the Norwegian plants. The central headquarters of FreMang in 
Paris allowed their Norwegian subsidiary substantial autonomy on operational issues. The top 
management team of the subsidiary consists of Norwegian nationals, except for the CFO, who 
was French. 
NorMang was a Norwegian family-owned company founded in 1875. NorMang consisted of a 
silico-manganese plant (200 employees) and a titanium and high purity iron plant (200 
employees). NorMang had a trading subsidiary for metallurgical product (67 employees) and 
shares in several power plants in Norway. In 2007, NorMang recorded a turnover of €931 
million. FreMang had been a provider of low-carbon manganese to NorMang and the workers 
in both firms belonged to the same union. Thus, the employees of the plants were acquainted 
through existing commercial relationships and union affiliation. FreMang employees 
appreciated the management style and the investment made by the French MNC and transferred 
these positive perceptions to NorMang employees in their interactions prior to the deal.  
The rationale of the acquisition and the expected synergies 
FreMang estimated that the acquisition of NorMang would result in an increase of 
approximately 20% in the production of manganese alloy and reinforce FreMang’s position as 
one of the world’s leading producers of manganese alloy. Moreover, the deal was motivated by 
access to complementary resources. FreMang is an integrated producer with mines of 
manganese ore in Gabon (Africa), providing ore to the Norwegian plants. In addition, its 
existing plants in Norway were to provide slag for NorMang to produce silico-manganese, 
securing supply of raw materials for NorMang. Top managers of both firms expected minimum 
annual operational synergies of €10 to 15 million from cost saving, revenue enhancement and 
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knowledge sharing. Operational synergies were expected from optimisation of raw material 
supply (the operation will durably secure NorMang supplies of low-carbon manganese), 
increased production capacity, improved coordination of the value chain and cost savings in 
purchase and logistics (the operation will allow economies of scale in purchase and co-
shipment). To achieve these synergies, plant specialisation was decided according to the core 
competencies of the plants. The two FreMang plants would be specialised in low carbon 
manganese, while the NorMang plant would be specialised in silico-manganese. The titanium 
plant would not be integrated in this plant specialisation program. Plant specialisation would 
allow an increased production capacity, reduce maintenance costs and increase efficiencies. 
When a furnace is used to produce both types of manganese (either silico-manganese or low 
carbon manganese), it is necessary to stop it and clean it between each production phase. Plant 
and furnace specialisation drastically reduced the maintenance and cleaning operations, 
subsequently leading to production capacity enhancement. No reduction in workforce was 
planned. Some synergies were expected from exchanges of knowledge and best practices 
between plants. For instance, NorMang was known for its high scores in health, safety and 
environment (HSE) issues. FreMang was interested in transferring NorMang’s HSE procedures 
to FreMang plants.  
In June 2008, 13 workshops with employees and managers from both companies were 
established to evaluate precise synergies and cost savings opportunities. The 13 workshops 
included Logistic, Production reallocation, R&D, Benchmarking, Management team, Energy, 
Accounting, Human Resources Management, Health and Safety, Purchasing, IT, Legal 
Structure and Commercial.  
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Data gathering  
Our case data consists of rich, longitudinal, primary data (in-depth interviews and informal 
observations and conversations) and secondary archival data (integration newsletters, 
integration plans and other internal documents). The archival data mostly addressed the 
financial structure of the deal and helped us to get a grasp of the timeline of events. These 
documents complemented our in-depth interviews and helped triangulate some of our findings. 
In April 2009, we conducted 10 exploratory interviews in both companies focusing on the 
characteristics of the industry, the strategic rationale for the deal and the planned integration. 
These interviews helped us familiarise with the research setting and build interactional expertise 
needed to fully grasp context in a qualitative process study (Collins, 2004; Langley et al, 2013)  
We then conducted 3 rounds of data collection. The first consisted of 56 interviews, from May 
to July 2009, in NorMang and FreMang. At this point, the plants were directly impacted by the 
financial crisis thus allowing us to collect real-time data about managers’ actions to cope and 
employees’ perceptions on these initiatives. From November 2009 to February 2010, 
production slowly returned to pre-crisis levels and during this point, we conducted our second 
round of data collection consisting of 49 interviews. Finally, from November 2010 to January 
2011, we conducted our third round of data collection consisting of 46 interviews, during which 
time the three plants were coordinated and integrated at the Norwegian level. The Norwegian 
subsidiary was starting to coordinate with other subsidiaries of the MNC in Gabon and in the 
USA and integration of support functions at the Norwegian level was continuing (integration 
of R&D and HRM practices).  
In order to ensure that multiple viewpoints were captured in our data, we interviewed people 
from different plants and levels of the organisation. Key informants were chosen on the basis 
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that they had access to specific information relevant to the research enquiry. This included top 
management team, HR personnel, and employees with specific integration responsibilities.  
INSERT TABLE A.1 ABOUT HERE 
The interview guide consisted of open-ended questions in order to encourage informants to 
account for their experiences of the integration and the crisis. For instance, we asked informants 
to share their perceptions about how the integration process was managed; how the crisis was 
handled and how they were affected by the changes linked to the integration process or to the 
crisis management initiatives. Follow-up questions were used to get beneath general responses 
and to further explore key issues. As the informants shared their experiences, they were also 
encouraged to give their assessments and feelings towards the events and actions they 
described. We conducted the interviews in the native language of each respondent (either 
Norwegian or French). Interviews typically lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. We interviewed 
until saturation in each phase, that is, until each new interview added little new information 
(Charmaz, 2006). After each phase of data collection, we presented our findings to the top 
management of the French MNC in Paris. This feedback process constituted an opportunity to 
discuss and validate our findings. 
Data analysis 
All interviews were transcribed, yielding approximately 2,700 double spaced pages of 
transcripts. We read and re-read the transcripts, looking for recurring themes in the data (Van 
Maanen, 1998). We extracted quotes that reflected the stories of the post-acquisition integration 
process (Langley et al., 2012). The accounts of the informants typically included reflections 
upon the crisis, their perceptions of the way the crisis was managed and consequences of the 
crisis. We gathered raw data into categories (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996) that encompassed 
crisis management, integration management, employees’ perceptions, managerial decisions and 
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actions, and organisational responses. Next, we reverted to the literature on crisis management 
and post-acquisition integration management to make sense of our preliminary findings. 
Finally, following axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), we searched for relationships 
between the categories identified in the emergent coding. As such, we identified two 
overarching dimensions that determine how the crisis influences the post-acquisition 
integration process. These are the overarching dimensions of “integration accelerators” and 
“integration impediments”.  
Parallel to the inductive coding of interviews, we analysed carefully the content of archival 
data. We juxtaposed quotes from interviews with the planning of synergies presented in 
integration newsletters. FreMang and NorMang had defined in the pre-acquisition phase the 
time (in months) needed to implement the main synergies (optimisation of raw material supply, 
specialisation of plants and coordination in purchase and logistics). Consequently, we compared 
the schedule with the effective progress to see whether the change associated with each synergy 
was implemented faster or slower. In addition to comparing information from secondary data 
and events realization, we asked our informants about the impact of the crisis on the integration 
process. We specifically paid attention to sentences such as: “it has been implemented faster 
because of the crisis” (integration accelerator) or “it was slowed down because of temporary 
lay-offs due to the crisis” (integration impediment). In the next section, we present our data and 
show how these findings emerged.  
FINDINGS  
Our findings show how post-acquisition integration is embedded in an ecology of on-going 
processes. As such, the planned integration process is distorted by events exogenous to the 
integration decisions and initiatives that shape the unfolding integration process and ultimately 
the realized integration. We first present in a narrative manner the ecology of processes we 
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observed in our case. We then show how being embedded in this ecology of processes shapes 
the integration process, through our emergent model of adaptive integration process.  
An ecology of processes  
We identified three distinct processes in our informants’ accounts, revolving around the issues 
of post-acquisition integration, production and crisis management. Figure A.2. illustrates the 
events and decisions we observed, and the relationships between these. The figure highlights 
the intertwined effects of the integration, crisis management and production processes, as 
managers diverted from the original integration plans to address the sudden fall in demand.  
INSERT FIGURE A.2 ABOUT HERE 
Firstly, we identified the process of production from our informants’ accounts of events and 
decisions. At the announcement of the acquisition in the spring of 2008, there were normal 
levels of production in the plants. However, a collapse of steel consumption led to a dramatic 
fall in demand for the firms’ products in the fall of 2008. This prompted FreMang to shut down 
production temporarily to avoid overcapacity. As demand increased in the fall of 2009, 
production was resumed and during the winter and spring of 2010 they returned to normal 
production levels.  
Secondly, we identified the process of crisis management. The drop in demand forced FreMang 
to initiate a host of crisis management initiatives, in the midst of implementing the acquisition, 
which were conducive to a deviation from the original integration plan. In Winter and Spring 
2010, when demand increased, crisis management initiatives were terminated and managers re-
launched the integration plan and finalized integration. 
Thirdly, we observed how the integration process unfolded and diverted from its planned course 
following the drop in demand. FreMang announced the friendly acquisition of NorMang in 
April 2008. NorMang had two main owners with 93% of the total shares (respectively 56 and 
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37%). In July 2008, FreMang bought 56% of NorMang from the majority shareholder and at 
the same period, the integration plan was kicked-off. The shares of the other main owner were 
due to be acquired in December 2008. However, in September 2008, the drop in demand led to 
the deterioration of FreMang’s share price thus the conditions of the exchange of share with the 
second shareholder could no longer be met. Consequently, the shareowner postponed the sale 
of his stock (37%). This delay in full ownership impeded FreMang’s ability to implement some 
integration initiatives such as the specialisation of plants, thus deviating from the original 
integration plan. Integration activities were also slowed down as employees’ interactions were 
limited during this period of temporary lay-offs. After twelve months of uncertainty, demand 
started to rise again in September 2009 and factories restarted their production, leading to the 
end of temporary lay-offs and the restart of integration activities. Meanwhile, following an 
increase in demand, the minority shareholder agreed to sell the remaining shares to FreMang. 
The integration process reverted to the original plan, and in the spring of 2010, the integration 
plan was finalized. Thus, we observed how the planned integration process was distorted by 
events exogenous to the integration process itself, and unfolded embedded in the ecology of 
other processes and issues the firm had to address.  
An emergent model of adaptive integration 
Our emergent model recasts the intended integration process as an adaptive process, embedded 
in an ecology of other processes and specifies the accelerating and impeding mechanisms that 
shape the unfolding integration process. Organizational attention shifts, as managers’ objectives 
and employees’ situational perceptions change, trigger deviation from the intended integration 
plan. Managerial initiatives to deal with the crisis on the one hand accelerated integration, by 
increased cooperation and coordination structures, and on the other hand impeded integration, 
by increasing competition and reducing knowledge transfer. With this model, we identify the 
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mechanisms shaping the planned integration process to generate the realized integration 
outcomes (Figure A.3). In the following sections, we detail the different components of our 
emergent model. 
INSERT FIGURE A.3 ABOUT HERE 
Organizational attention shift 
Our data show that the onset of the crisis triggered attention shifts; managers revised objectives 
and organizational members’ situational perceptions changed. To handle the effect of the crisis, 
managers revised their objectives. Our data show how the fall in demand in Autumn 2008 
became the trigger for a shift in organizational attention as managers’ focus shifted from how 
to integrate and coordinate the plants to how to avoid the long-term detrimental effects of the 
crisis. These new objectives were geared toward avoiding over-capacity and cost savings and 
cost control to cope with the lack of demand. The contextual change affects managerial 
attention so that they revise their objectives, take new initiatives and let other initiatives stall. 
New objectives and the subsequent crisis management initiatives caused employee perceptions 
of the organisational context and integration process to change. With this change, managers 
needed to further clarify and re-evaluate their objectives:  
“We had to manage the risk of confusion between crisis related issues and integration 
issues in [NorMang] employees’ mind. We had to communicate a lot to clarify the 
situation” (FreMang Sales VP). 
The changed situational perceptions shaped the revised objectives, as employees confused crisis 
and integration related issues, and subsequently managers needed to revise their objectives 
further. Employees’ initial positive perceptions of the merits of the acquisition became blurred. 
Because of the imbrication of the processes, they had a tendency to mix issues related to the 
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integration process and those related to the crisis management process. This blurring tendency 
created ambiguity, uncertainty and unrest.  
While management resources were already strained, as managers were occupied with 
integration issues, dealing with the crisis demanded substantial management resources as well. 
The increased focus on financial reporting and coordinating cost initiatives was time consuming 
for top managers, line managers and controlling functions in the firms. In addition, these 
initiatives were described by the plant managers as having shifted management attention from 
coordination and building ties between the plants, to managing issues within each plant.  
“We have been allowed to loosen the tie to the other plants to focus on this plant. 
We are running at a lower capacity, we have a different culture, and there will 
be lower production before there is an up-turn, so I think it is right to let our 
plant run its own, independent developmental process and self-cultivate” 
(FreMang manager). 
Organising a temporary lay-off was a task for general managers and HR managers. 
Management resources were tied up in time consuming mitigation of employee unrest and 
worries about down-sizing and lay-offs, which involved extensive communication with the 
organisation. In addition, HR managers were involved with securing compensation for 
employees and organising the schedule for the operators who were now working part-time, took 
focus away from integration issues: 
“The main challenge now for us, as leaders, is to communicate and make people 
understand the crisis.” (FreMang manager). 
The new objectives and the subsequent crisis management initiatives were re-interpreted by 
employees whose perceptions of the situation changed. Initially, employees were cooperative 
and optimistic about the future coordination of the value chain. The delay in full ownership and 
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the crisis management initiatives created some uncertainties about the acquisition and their 
initial positive perceptions of the merits of the acquisition waned. As the fall in demand hit the 
plants, employees’ perceptions about the cause of the crisis the plants were facing were blurred. 
Employees tended to blame the acquisition for the economic troubles and the shutdown of the 
plants. In addition to the confusion around the cause of the economic problems, employees also 
claimed that NorMang management would have handled the crisis better than FreMang. For 
example, when addressing the shutdown of his plant, one employee described: “We at 
NorMang, we would have done differently (regarding plant shutdown)” (Employee, NorMang). 
NorMang employees perceived FreMang management as less capable than NorMang 
management had been, and following this, the acquisition was not perceived to contribute to 
the development of NorMang. One manager described how the fear and discontent with the 
crisis “spilled over” to perceptions about the acquisition: 
“When everything is OK, people are happy with the merger with FreMang. When 
there is a negative situation, it’s FreMang’s fault. Employees in my plant think 
that the crisis would have been softer without FreMang” (Plant Manager, 
NorMang).  
The shift in managerial attention neither uniformly nor univocally shaped the unfolding 
integration process. We found that the adaptive integration process involved both accelerated 
integration, by increasing coordination and collaboration and decelerated integration, by 
creating competition, diverging management focus and hampering knowledge sharing. 
Accelerators of integration 
From our data we observed mechanisms that accelerated integration; firstly the emergence of 
coordination structures and secondly increased cooperation between the plants to deal with the 
effects of the crisis.  
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Coordination structures 
The emergent need for cost-cutting triggered the establishment of coordination structures that 
were not initially forecasted in the integration plan.  
“During the summer 2009, to face the crisis, we created a task force to manage 
inventories. The team made of Norwegians and French from the sales and the 
production departments met every 10 days. This task force was supposed to be a 
transient structure of adjustment during the crisis. But as it worked out very well, 
we decide to perennialise this mode of management” (Manager, FreMang).  
“We created task forces to manage inventories. We involved people from management 
control, purchasing, sales and production. These structures were created spontaneously 
to face the crisis and they actually last because they work. They help strengthening the 
ties between Paris and Norway and also between the different plants” (CFO FreMang). 
Thus, the crisis pushed the creation of efficient coordination structures improving the 
coordination between the two partners. The crisis also required an improved management of 
cost. Consequently, the implementation of FreMang cost control and cash management 
software in the acquired plants was accelerated. In other words, through the focus on cost 
control and the need to keep track of the cost situation in the plants, the application of 
administrative control and coordination structures were sped up:  
“Before the merger, we had defined a schedule for the implementation of our cost 
control and cash management software in the plants acquired. Because of the 
crisis, we had to accelerate its implementation; consequently we now have an 
efficient reporting six months in advance compared to what was initially 
planned” (Manager, FreMang).  
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In terms of value chain improvement, an important synergy expected from the acquisition was 
to secure raw materials for the production plants, as one of FreMang’s existing plants delivered 
raw materials to the acquired plant. The crisis increased the need for securing low-cost raw 
materials. This accelerated the integration process in terms of value chain management. The 
integration of the value chain and the coordinated management of raw materials were realised 
nine months in advance compared to the planning of synergies designed in the pre-acquisition 
phase. This is evidence of the greater level of attentional engagement in coordination structures 
by management in order to manage the contextual crisis. 
Cooperation between the plants 
The emergent need for extra synergies and perception of the crisis as a common enemy brought 
about initiatives to cooperate across plants. The crisis accelerated the synergy hunt, and 
employees and managers tried to go beyond the cost-saving synergies initially planned in the 
pre-acquisition phase. This hunt for synergies and solutions to further reduce anticipated cost 
savings increased cooperation between the plants, as employees and managers were trying to 
maximize short-term benefits: 
“The crisis literally boosted the hunt for new ideas and solutions. Some decisions 
taken to manage the crisis, even if they had no direct link with the synergies, had 
a positive effect on the integration process. This effervescence of solution was 
very good for the success of the integration” (Manager, FreMang).  
The crisis implied insecurities for all the Norwegian plants, even though some plants 
experienced more detrimental effects than did others. Our informants described their feeling of 
“fighting against a common enemy”. They described a shared perception of “being in the same 
boat” that was a basis for cooperation between plants. This feeling also filtered up to the 
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Parisian headquarters. In other words, both NorMang and FreMang employees and managers 
perceived that they needed to work together in a cohesive way to cooperate and face the crisis. 
“When the crisis hit us, we all stuck together. Nobody tried to save himself at 
the expense of others. We were not pulling dirty tricks on each other. People 
were trying to solve the problems, they were helping each other whatever their 
plants or their nationalities. I would say that we were solidary in adversity. I 
wonder whether this will last once the crisis is over” (CFO FreMang)  
Our informants also described the crisis as a shared challenge for all the Norwegian plants 
facing increased competition from FreMang worldwide plants. This perception of competition 
with the other plants worldwide fostered the cohesion between the Norwegian plants and 
reinforced employees willingness to cooperate and to facilitate integration. Informants 
described the importance of making the Norwegian plants as an entity geared towards 
competing with low-cost resources in the rest of the world:  
“The challenge is to make FreMang happy with us. They are global, and can get 
their ore processed other places (…). Our challenge is to make sure the 
Norwegian plants are prioritised in the future.” (NorMang employee) 
Impediments of integration 
The crisis also had an effect of management not driving through initiatives that were originally 
planned for the acquisition. As management revised their objectives and employees perceptions 
changed, deviations from the integration plan led to impediments to planned integration. The 
refocusing on integration accelerators and energy and effort being devoted to gaining quicker 
results than previously planned, meant that other integration issues were crowded out. Our data 
show that particularly two mechanisms, namely increased competition between the plants and 
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decreased knowledge sharing between plants, were key impediments of the planned integration 
process.  
Competition between plants 
Employees in the acquired plants voiced their fear of losing bargaining power at the plant level. 
As one of many plants in the foreign MNE, they felt removed from where decisions were made, 
at the central headquarter in Paris. As a stand-alone Norwegian firm, the plants were previously 
close to decision-making processes and did not need to compete for resources from 
headquarters. As the decision to temporarily shut down production was made, the acquired plant 
employees were concerned about the future of their plants, as the MNE had many other plants 
they could choose. 
“Now people here feel the competition. We are three of sixteen furnaces in 
Norway, and we have to do what we can do to make sure that our furnaces are 
up and running. We cannot produce to store anymore. We are publicly listed and 
everything needs to be reported. We are challenged on the numbers – what last 
month’s numbers were. (…) there is now competition between the plants about 
who gets to produce.” (NorMang employee) 
“If you compare us with the other plants (in Norway) we are at the top. (…) We 
have to show them that we are good, so that we get the necessary investments to 
run the plant the way it was run before. “(NorMang employee) 
In addition, the existing FreMang plants in Norway were concerned about internal competition 
from the newly acquired plants.  
The pre-acquisition relationship between the two FreMang plants in Norway had been very 
competitive. The crisis and the acquisition increased competition for resources from the French 
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headquarters. In one of the FreMang plants their fear was grounded in their perception of the 
other plant as closer to the Norwegian FreMang management:  
“We are further away from the corporate [Norwegian] headquarter, and they 
are prioritised (…) that is where the management team is, they are preferred” 
(Employee, FreMang). 
Beyond fears and perceptions, facts and figures about cut backs on investments from FreMang 
headquarters were an objective measure of an increased competition between plants:  
“In terms of investments, if something breaks or something needs an 
improvement… there are projects that have been approved that are postponed” 
(Employee, FreMang). 
Plant specialisation splits the production process over the various plants, and thus requires 
collaboration and coordination across the plants. Competition between the production units was 
detrimental to integration.  
Lack of knowledge sharing 
Knowledge transfer is important for transferring strategic capabilities between acquirer and 
target companies. In the case of FreMang and NorMang, synergies were mainly oriented 
towards production improvement and cost reduction but some were also expected from 
exchanges of knowledge and R&D, and best practices in operation management, safety and 
security at work. For instance, in the pre-deal phase, FreMang managers noticed that NorMang 
plants had outstanding records for safety and security at work (few incidents were recorded the 
five years prior to the acquisition). Health and safety issues are essential in the metallurgical 
industry, and FreMang managers had planned to organise knowledge sharing workshops 
between NorMang and FreMang employees to improve frequency rate (number of accidents 
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reported per million hours worked) and the severity rate (number of days lost per 1000 working 
hours). These workshops were delayed due to shutdowns and temporary layoffs. Temporary 
layoffs reduced interactions between employees and opportunities for best practice transfers 
and knowledge exchange. Delays in synergy workshop implementation were also observed in 
other areas such as R&D. 
“Now we have temporary lay-offs, but of course, when we are in full operation 
again, and when we are allowed to travel again, then we can get access to how 
they do things, and there are synergies, specifically in R&D and operations 
management.” (Employee, FreMang). 
“Now we are a pure ferromanganese plant, while they are a silico-manganese 
plant. They buy slag from us, and they are dependent on our products for their 
production, so I think, as soon as the crisis is over, we will cooperate to learn 
from each other.” (Employee, NorMang). 
Cost reductions further reduced interactions as planned travels or visits between the plants were 
cancelled and restrictions were made on future travel. Top-level management was exempt from 
restrictions on travel, and the union representatives from the plants still interacted due to their 
union networks, while line-managers and lower level employees had very few contacts between 
plants. Consequently, cost reduction, due to the crisis, hindered learning and knowledge sharing 
between plants. As one employee describes: 
”There are cost-cutting initiatives, so there is not a lot of travelling. It is not that 
easy to learn from one another when we can’t come and see what the others are 
doing. There is no contact across the plants.”(Employee, NorMang). 
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Realized integration 
Our findings show how the realized integration of FreMang and NorMang deviated from the 
planned integration. We observed that some benefits of integration were achieved earlier than 
expected, while some were delayed. Where there were accelerators in effect, integration, and 
subsequently the realization of synergies, were facilitated through faster implementation of 
coordination structures and increased cooperation between plants. This shows attentional 
engagement with these issues, and “early achieved benefits” served to augment that attention. 
Where managerial attention diminished, integration was impeded. Here the acquired business 
units became more independent from the acquirer than was originally planned which resulted 
in the slowdown of realized synergies and shows the lack of attentional engagement.  
We argue that impediments of integration, in the complexities of an adaptive integration 
process, unfold simultaneously to the accelerators of integration. Also, we observe that some 
initiatives influenced both acceleration and deceleration. For instance, on the one hand, cost 
cutting initiatives led to a delay in the implementation of synergy workshops and a subsequent 
lack of knowledge sharing. On the other hand, the same cost cutting initiatives led to faster 
implementation of coordination structures and subsequently more integration.  
Among the five integration objectives defined by top managers in the pre-deal phase to achieve 
value creation in the post-acquisition phase, three were implemented faster to cope with the 
crisis (IT Systems integration, optimisation of raw material supply, coordination in purchasing 
and logistics) and two were delayed (plant specialisation and knowledge transfer). In this 
manner, realized integration deviated from the planned integration process, as some activities 
were performed earlier and some later than initially planned. Tables A.4 and A.5 summarize 
comparisons of the implementation of intended and actual integration initiatives. 
INSERT TABLE A.4 ABOUT HERE 
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We examined how the post-acquisition integration process is shaped by its embedded nature, 
addressing the lack of awareness in the extant M&A literature of the role of the environmental 
context in which post-acquisition integration is situated. We took a less myopic perspective 
than is common in the literature to evaluate how parallel and simultaneous processes shape the 
planned integration process. Context is not just a stimulus environment but also a nested 
arrangement of structures and processes shaped by the subjective interpretations of actors 
(Pettigrew, 1992). Our findings show how events, exogenous to the integration process itself, 
shape the unfolding integration process, recasting it as an adaptive process embedded in an 
ecology of other on-going processes.  
We found that post-acquisition integration is embedded in a mesh of intertwining processes that 
influence how the integration process unfolds. With a contextual shock, these intertwined 
processes are subject to stresses and strains, confronting managers with a host of different 
challenges. This brings about organizational attention shifts, wherein managers promote 
different objectives, stimulate different activities (or not stimulate previously planned 
activities), so engaging in variation reducing or variation increasing activities (Burgelman, 
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1991) and also engage in contradictory initiatives. Managers adjust their attention to reflect 
contextual change (Ocasio, 2011) and this has implications for organizational change: the ways 
in which acquisition integration unfolds. Our case also shows how a specific negative 
contextual change brings about alterations within an ecology of processes so that some 
integration practices are accelerated and others impeded.  
Overall, our findings show that, when one adopts a panoptic perspective, the integration process 
can be defined as an emergent process of readjustment of the coordination activities between 
companies embedded in an ecology of other internal and external process that shape the nature 
and the pace of the planned integration. Thus contributing to theorizing the complexities of 
integration and adding to our understanding of the challenges facing acquiring firms regarding 
achieving the desired degree and speed of integration.  
 
Implications and Contributions 
Our findings have important contributions to the existing literature on post-M&A integration. 
We found that contextual change exposes interactions between simultaneous processes, 
eliciting accelerators and impediments of integration.  
Defining the context of post-acquisition integration as an “ecology of processes” that shapes 
and distorts the intended integration trajectory brings multi-vocality to the traditional 
understanding and definition of the integration process as a linear, deliberate, and univocal 
process. Although Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991:106) defined integration as “an interactive 
and gradual process in which individuals from two organisations learn to work together and 
cooperate in the transfer of strategic capabilities”, subsequent research has tended to focus more 
on the planned dimension of the integration process where control of the target and coordination 
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of activities are key elements (Pablo 1994), highlighting the importance of managerial agency 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2000).  
As integration processes do not evolve in an organisational vacuum, integration decisions are 
not developed in an integration vacuum, either. Thus managerial decisions are affected by 
context so that their attention shifts in terms of perspective and engagement (Ocasio, 2011). 
These shifts can trigger both accelerating and impeding actions. Our findings thus contribute to 
our understanding of the link between managerial decision-making and M&A performance 
(Haleblian et al., 2009) and particularly the processes that intermediate between integration 
intentions and post-acquisition outcomes (King 2004, Cording et al., 2008). Graebner (2004) 
and Colman and Lunnan (2011) found that managerial actions and issues endogenous to the 
integration process shape serendipitous value creation. Our study complements this by 
conceptualising the sources of serendipity and unexpected outcomes as emerging from the 
exogenous context. 
This paper exposes the dynamic, emergent and practice based aspects of M&A integration 
(Teerikangas, 2012) and in so doing explain some aspects of the ambiguity and uncertainty 
commonly observed. Traditionally, the post-acquisition integration process has been 
approached as an intended process (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
Pablo, 1994) where integration unfolds under the management’s control. More recently, authors 
have tended to adopt a contingent approach that breaks with the original rational and intended 
view of post-acquisition integration (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Gates and Very, 2003; 
Monin et al., 2013; Quah and Young, 2005; Schweiger and Denisi, 1991; Vaara, 2003). Our 
findings are in line with this approach and show that the integration process is also partially 
outside of managers’ control, as accelerators and impeding mechanisms can emerge from the 
disruptions in the organisation’s context. For this reason, it would be unwise to continue to 
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think of post-acquisition integration as an intended plan that works out in practice, but realise 
that M&A takes place in a rich changing context that will serve to interfere with the intended 
timing and sequences of integration practices. Conceptualizing the integration process as an 
adaptive embedded process, recasts our conception of managerial agency in post-acquisition 
integration as more fluid and emergent than currently represented in the M&A literature. 
We furthermore contribute to the understanding of the role and consequences of speed in M&A 
(Stahl et al., 2013). The issue of speed and timing of post-acquisition integration has been 
debated for some time (Schweiger et al., 1993), and is clearly a topic of importance to M&A 
academics and managers. However attempts to identify an optimal speed for integration have 
had mixed results (Angwin, 2004; Quah and Young, 2005; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). 
Whilst early contributions identified the importance of speed to integration (Angwin 2004; 
Quah and Young, 2005) and have recognized that integration speed may be affected by internal 
and external contexts (Homburg and Bucerius 2006), they have tended to assume a straight-line 
relationship between speed and M&A performance. However it is observed that post acquisition 
integration can last for long periods of time (Angwin 2000) and it is unlikely that the 
surrounding contexts will remain unchanged throughout. This study shows that integration 
speed is affected by contextual change and so is unlikely to be uniform overall and will also 
vary between different processes. We show that the speed of integration as intentionally defined 
by managers in the pre-deal phase is generally not how post-acquisition integration plays out 
in practice as the likelihood of contextual change is high. Our findings suggest that post-
acquisition integration consists of many speeds, each of which may be accelerated or impeded 
during an integration process when faced with an external contextual shock. As managerial 
attention refocuses to adapt to contextual change and their level of engagement adjusts, the 
originally coherent planned speed of integration, although perhaps necessary for rationalising 
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the deal to stakeholders in the first place, will change accordingly, with some aspects of 
integration accelerating and others slowing down or even being reversed. These multiple speeds 
can lead to distortion of synergy creation and also create unanticipated tensions, and perhaps 
opportunities, within the ecology of processes identified in this study. Our case thus contributes 
to extent literature on speed by showing that speed is not uniform, nor univocal, and temporal 
distortions are likely to affect final integration outcomes. 
Managerial implications 
Post-acquisition integration processes may be severely disrupted by unanticipated events that 
happen in parallel and that may distort the integration trajectory - things will not play out as 
planned. It is important therefore that managers consider what integration practices are likely 
to be affected in a temporal sense by contextual events and issues and what this may mean to 
the anticipated integration plan. This may mean that acquiring companies ought to engage in a 
certain amount of environmental scanning or even some scenario planning in order to be 
prepared for contextual eventualities which may disrupt integration timetables. Consequently, 
managers should be able to identify in their own organisational context, which processes (being 
internal or external) may have an influence on integration implementation and question their 
initial integration plans. Depending on the volatility of their industry or business, the 
organisational context may be more or less subject to unanticipated events that may shape the 
integration process. One wonders for instance how the surprise decision by the UK to opt for 
Brexit, may be affecting the post-acquisition integrations of European companies in process at 
the current time. 
Our findings imply a need for awareness about how contextual change may affect managerial 
attentional perspective and attentional engagement in terms of what may be gained and lost 
through refocusing. Whilst we have shown that attention focusing upon acquisition accelerators 
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may involve a feedback loop further intensifying the focus of that managerial attention, such 
that short term wins will seem to indicate a positive acquisition success trajectory, the reverse 
may also hold; that lack of managerial attention may result in less integration, further 
diminishing attention in a negative feedback loop, and so some original integration synergies 
are crowded out and potentially forgotten. This raises the interesting question of what is lost, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, when managerial attention is diverted? 
It is also important for integration managers to pay attention to specific issues related to 
employees’ reactions in a post-acquisition integration process. For instance, managers should 
have efficient communications to cope with employees’ doubts and uncertainties (Schweiger 
and Denisi, 1991; Angwin et al., 2016), and they should foster a sense of continuity for 
employees (Van Knippenberg and Van Leewen, 2001). The list of actions that managers should 
undertake to foster employees’ well-being and commitment in the integration process is well 
documented in the literature on M&A. However, most of the studies in this literature deal with 
post-acquisition integration processes in a stable period or do not assess the influence of the 
external context on the integration process. We argue that these assumptions are unrealistic as 
acquisitions are more likely to experience contextual change whilst integration is taking place, 
particularly as integration in many instances can take years (Angwin, 2000). Indeed, significant 
contextual change during integration is a main contributor to the difficulties of predicting post-
acquisition performance. Mindful of this, managers should consider the impact of accelerating 
or impeding integration practices upon employee morale and commitment and adjust their 
communications accordingly. 
Our analysis allows us to raise another issue that managers should take into account in a crisis 
period: they should pay attention to the risk of confusion amongst employees between the 
challenges related to the acquisition and the challenges linked to the crisis. Our case shows that 
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employees’ perceptions of the crisis were confounded with their perceptions of the acquisition. 
The cost-cutting initiatives and temporary layoffs were in the acquired plants assumed to have 
been harsher for the plant than they would have been with their previous owner. Overall, in an 
M&A, managers should communicate clearly (Angwin et al.,2016) to distinguish the decisions 
taken as a consequence of the integration and the decision taken as a consequence of any other 
external or internal events.  
Finally, we propose that top managers should not take a myopic view when evaluating the 
progress and efficiency of the post-acquisition integration. For instance, they could assess the 
capacity of their integration managers and teams (Trichterborn et al., 2016) to adapt and 
redefine the integration strategy and integration initiatives according to the changes that may 
emerge during the integration process. Taking an ecology of processes perspective, we argue 
that managers cannot totally control the post-acquisition integration as they have to manage 
multiple objectives in a multitude of intertwined processes. They design rational initiatives 
aimed at achieving multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives. Recasting the integration 
process as an adaptive and embedded process implies the need to adopt a broader, more 
contextualised and less deliberate view to evaluate post-acquisition integration efficiency.  
 
Limitations and boundary conditions 
Although in our case study, we have examined only one type of external event, a fall in demand 
due to an economic crisis, there are many other types of events that may affect merging 
organisations, and accelerate or impede integration. For instance, a sudden increase in demand, 
regulatory changes, stock market booms, political shocks, scandals and corruption may all serve 
to distort the intended acquisition integration trajectories (Angwin et al., 2015). In the case 
under study, we highlight the global economic crisis and the subsequent fall in demand as an 
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example of an external event that may shape the nature and the pace of the integration but we 
believe our findings would hold true in other circumstances.  
We might conjecture that other contextual changes during integration might be positive for the 
organisation, so eliciting a different set of responses in the ecosystem of processes. In our study 
the economic crisis significantly reduced the amount of organisational slack available and so 
attention focused upon cost reducing activities and short-term profitability. Practices that were 
inhibited were those that would take a much longer time frame to implement and would have 
less certain performance improvement effects. If a contextual change is positive, rather than 
negative, we might suggest that more organisational slack would be available than expected. 
This might reduce the urgency for cost reduction actions for instance and instead increase focus 
on other activities, such as knowledge exchange that might lead to longer-term performance 
improvement. Again, the effect of a contextual shock is likely to have a differential impact on 
the integration speeds of different aspects of the post-acquisition integration ecosystem. In 
addition, as hinted at in the case study, integrations may experience more than one contextual 
shock during the whole amalgamation process, which could result in a variety of changes in the 
integration ecosystem overtime. Studying the effects of various exogenous shocks during post 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1. Breakdown of Interviews (n = 151) by Company, Hierarchical Level, and 
Period 




Fall 2009 to 
Winter 2010 
Round 3 




FreMang managers 15 11 16 42 
FreMang employees 15 15 11 41 
NorMang managers 9 10 9 28 
NorMang employees 17 13 10 40 
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Table A.4. Sped up integration areas: Comparison of intended and realized integration implementation 
 







IT Systems integration T0 => T9 T0 => T3 
Implementation of IT systems 
in NorMang plants was 
accelerated to better control 
costs in a crisis context. 
Optimisation of raw material 
supply 
T0 => T12 T0 => T3 
Optimisation of raw material 
supply was accelerated to 
secure low-cost access to raw 
material and subsequently 
reduce costs in a crisis context. 
Coordination in purchasing 
and logistics 
T0 => T12 T0 => T6 
Coordination in purchasing and 
logistics was accelerated to 
reduce costs in a crisis context. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Duration is expressed in months. 
T0 corresponds to the kick off meeting of the acquisition in June 2008. 
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Table A.5. Slown down integration areas: Comparison of intended and realized integration implementation 







Plant specialisation T0 => T12 T0 => T18 
Plant specialisation was delayed 
because FreMang could not get 
full ownership of NorMang. 
Knowledge Transfer (best 
practices sharing) 
T0 => T12 T0 => T18 
Knowledge transfer was 
delayed because of temporary 
lay-offs and cut back on travel 
expenses. Employees could not 





                                                 
2
 Duration is expressed in months elapsed since the kick off meeting of the acquisition in June 2008. 
. 
